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FIJI
Sociopolitical and economic conse-
quences of the 1987 coups in Fiji
were still unfolding by January 1998.
The year began with a 20 percent
devaluation of the Fiji dollar by
Finance Minister James Ah Koy.
Apart from the external negative
impact of the economic turmoil in
Southeast Asia, there have been major
internal contributions to the down-
turn of Fiji's economy since the coups.
Politico-economic instability after
the coups has been compounded by
deliberate economic disasters such as
the F$220 million loss by the
National Bank of Fiji due to bad
debts. Furthermore, there is still
uncertainty surrounding the renewal
of leases under the Agriculture
Landlords and Tenants Act and the
relocation of tenants whose leases
have not and will not be renewed. At
the constitutional level, the effects of
the reviewed 1990 constitution
remain to be seen. There have also
been uncertainties and insecurities
regarding the move toward public sec-
tor reforms within the larger frame-
work of structural adjustment.
Allegations emerged in early
January 1998 that some members of
Parliament attempted to suppress or
tamper with evidence regarding Fiji's
National Bank scandal. Corruption
has also been a force to be reckoned
with (Times, I, 3 Jan 1998).
Given both internal and external
factors, the devaluation of the Fiji
dollar was to be expected. Investment
was sluggish, consumer spending was
low, and there was moderate infla-
tion. The Fiji dollar had also strength-
ened against those of its major trad-
ing partners, Australia and New
Zealand (Review, Feb 1998, 2). A
local economist argued, with refer-
ence to a popular international rugby
event, that devaluation is a short-term
solution to an economic crisis and
that "even the 20 per cent devalua-
tion is too low. Someone has to pay
for things like the Hong Kong 7S holi-
day" (Review, Feb 1998), let alone
the National Bank's F$220 million in
bad debts and the regular overseas
trips of members of Parliament.
The governor of the Reserve Bank
of Fiji stated that the devaluation
would, among other things, increase
the competitiveness of Fiji's exports,
make locally produced goods cheaper,
encourage overseas investment in Fiji,
increase demand for locally produced
goods, and prop up employment and
income (Times, 21 Jan 1998). Now, a
year after the 20 percent devaluation
of the Fiji dollar, most families are
still struggling to make ends meet,
and those most affected have been the
economically disadvantaged groups
such as low-income single mothers;
low earners such as garment-factory
workers, and subsistence and semi-
subsistence rural dwellers. The
Review explained that for some fami-
lies, "trying to make ends meet on a
F$ 50 weekly income is like climbing
Mount Everest" (Sept 1998, 21).
Various social problems have
emerged or increased, perhaps as a
direct result of the weak economy.
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Crime has been on the rise, especially
burglary, which has increased by 40
percent. Housebreaking increased by
13 percent. The Fiji Times reported
that "the increasing incidence of bur-
glary and break-ins may well be a
function of the national economy,
which remains sluggish in most sec-
tors" (18 Feb, 18). By December,
law-and-order problems were still
increasing. Large supermarkets,
service stations, business payrolls,
and even banks have been victims
(Review, Dec 1998). A common fea-
ture of robberies in Fiji since 1987
has been the wearing of balaclavas by
armed men-possibly the only out-
standing contribution of Rabuka's
coups to the ordinary grassroots
Fijian people.
Other forms of protest have
emerged in 1998 to threaten the basis
of both Fijian and Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) leader-
ship. Within Fijian society itself,
landowners have blocked roads or
demanded money for the use of their
resources. Due to the promises of the
coups to the indigenous Fijians,
various vanua have demanded just
compensation for the use of their
resources. By October 1998, the gov-
ernment had partly yielded to the
monetary demand of the Monasavu
people for the use of their land, on
which the Monasavu Hydroelectric
plant is built. Conflict between the
landowners and the Fiji Electricity
Authority resulted in the deployment
of the Fiji Police special task force to
guard the premises for more than a
month.
As a consequence of the increase in
crime and other unforeseen forms of
protest, the government allocated an
additional F$5.8 million to the F$36.4
million police budget for 1999 to
cater for anticorruption efforts that,
when studied carefully, mostly involve
the upper and middle classes. An
additional F$450,000 annually was
allocated for the operation of the
Prisons Department for the next three
years. However, despite this increase
in budget, Finance Minister James Ah
Koy declared that the problem of law
and order is not going to be solved by
money alone (Review, Dec 1998, 31).
He fell short of explaining the other
means of maintaining law and order.
If an improvement in the economy
is directly linked to issues of law and
order, then the future may not be very
bright if one relies on the predictions
of the country's economic gurus.
While Fiji government economists
predict an economic recovery within
the next two to three years, Professor
in Economics at the University of the
South Pacific David Forsyth has
argued that prediction is difficult in
a small economy like Fiji's: "Govern-
ment probably does not know what
the policies are in detail. Progress is
not monitored carefully and people
do not know what is happening
because it is not publicised" (Review,
Sept 1998, 20).
Perhaps the economy is a direct
reflection of the unstable political
climate. This has become even more
of a challenge to the ruling SVT gov-
ernment after new electoral bound-
aries were drawn up following the
amendment of the 1990 constitution.
While the constituencies have become
larger, there has been a reduction in
the number of communal seats, which
have long been the political power
base of the Fijian ruling elites.
POLITICAL REVIEWS. MELANESIA
On the other hand, open seats have
been reintroduced and once again
enable cross-voting among the ethnic
groups, as was stipulated in the 1970
constitution. The allocation of seats
for the different rolls are l7 Fijian
communal (based on provincial
demarcation); 6 Fijian urban; 19
Indian communal; 3 General commu-
nal; I Rotuman; and 25 open.
The House of Representatives con-
sists of 7 I members who are elected
by voters registered in one of the four
separate racially based electoral rolls
(Fijian, Indian, Rotuman, and General
[Other]). Voters from all of these
communities will elect 25 members to
the open seats, giving a "multiracial
look" to Fiji's electoral system.
Drawing up electoral boundaries
has not been an easy task for the
Constituency Boundaries Commission,
considering that there are four sepa-
rate electoral rolls plus an open elec-
toral roll. Thus the Fiji Islands have
been demarcated five times to define
the five major constituency bound-
aries-the Fijian Provincial Constitu-
encies, the Indian Communal Con-
stituencies, the General Communal
Constituencies, the Fijian Urban
Constituencies, and the Open Constit-
uencies. Voters in Fiji will cast their
votes twice: once for one of the ethnic
categories, and once for the open
category, where they can exercise free
choice irrespective of the ethnicity
of the candidate. Perhaps, for those
running for election in May 1999,
candidates for the open seats will
have a tougher battle because they
must really have multiethnic appeal
to be voted into Parliament.
For the current members of Par-
liament, the redrawing of electoral
boundaries implies security for some
and insecurity for others. In the
province of Lau for instance, two of
the current members in communal
seats will become redundant, as the
number of communal seats has been
reduced from three to one. However,
one of them might consider contesting
the Lau-Taveuni-Rotuma open seat.
With a boundary as open as this, where
three provinces and more than three
ethnic groups are involved, the "multi-
ethnic appeal" of the candidate becomes
a need. Furthermore, a candidate who
is elected on an open ticket can claim
wider representation than one who is
elected on a communal ticket.
For large provincial communal
constituencies such as Tailevu, which
has now been divided into Tailevu
South Communal and Tailevu North
Communal, a number of things are
implied. First, the dominance of one
or two vanua within the old con-
stituency will be put to the test', as
each division may prefer to field its
own local candidate. It is highly
unlikely that a chief of Bau in the
Tailevu South Constituency would
want to contest the Tailevu North
Communal seat, if there are eligible
local candidates. In the long run, this
division may alter the nature of
patron-client politics, which have
consolidated within Fijian society
since the days of colonialism and the
establishment of the Native (Fijian)
Administration (now Fijian Affairs)
and the Council of Chiefs.
Second, the division of such large
provinces may enable voters to have
better representation in Parliament. In
the 1990 constitution, where the
province of Tailevu for instance was
just one communal district with three
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candidates for Parliament, promises to
voters were not well delivered because
the three represented everyone in the
province. With the new electoral
boundaries voters will demand that
promises be kept, as they know
specifically who is representing them
in Parliament. Perhaps, in the long
run, this would imply that only the
best would dare to contest elections.
A third possible effect of the
change in electoral boundaries for the
Fijian communal voters is that align-
ment with one particular party may
be challenged. A good Fijian candi-
date who does not belong to the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
may still win a seat in Parliament.
This can be attained through one of
the many Fijian political parties,
which include the Fijian Association
Party (FAP), the Fijian Nationalist
Party, the Vanua Tako-Lavo Party, the
Veitokani ni Lotu Vakarisito
(Christian Fellowship Party), and the
Fiji Labour Party (FLP).
With the redrawing of electoral
boundaries, new "marriage propos-
als" have been made across ethnic
boundaries. The ruling Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei, the National
Federation Party (NFP), and the
United General Voters have decided
to tie the knot. However, three in a
marriage may become too many after
a while. This is a real marriage of
convenience given that the first two
parties represent both Fijian and
Indian conservative interests. The say-
ing "politics is the art of the possible"
was validated when the National
Federation Party fell in love with
Sitiveni Rabuka's (SVT) party.
Another coalition has been formed
between Sakeasi Butadroka's Fijian
Nationalist Party and the newly
formed Vanua Tako-Lavo Party, both
of which represent nationalist Fijian
interests. The Vanua Tako-Lavo Party
has a seat in Parliament that was won
when Kavekini Navuso thrashed the
candidate who was jointly fielded by
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni
Taukei and the Fijian Association
Party in the Naitasiri by-election in
1997. The Fijian Nationalist-Vanua
Tako-Lavo Coalition has survived
through its appeal to indigenous
Fijian sentiments regarding the own-
ership of resources on native land.
Navuso's victory in Naitasiri had a lot
to do with his party's contribution in
the dispute regarding compensation at
Monasavu. With disputes regarding
land and other resources increasing,
the Fijian Nationalist-Vanua Tako-
Lavo Coalition should not be dis-
missed easily.
The coalition between the Fiji
Labour Party, the Fijian Association
Party, and the Party of National Unity
(PANU) is also a force to be reckoned
with in the May 1999 general elec-
tions. The Fijian Association Party
was a breakaway group of the SVT
party. In August 1998 it suffered great
loss with the passing of its leader,
Josevata Kamikamica, who had the
potential to become prime minister
under this coalition. Adi Kuini
Bavadra Speed (former widow of Dr
Timoci Bavadra) took over the leader-
ship of the Fijian Association Party,
an appointment that caused major
conflicts within the party and later led
to the sacking of two of their four
members of Parliament. One of the
sacked members, Dr Fereti Dewa, dis-
sented on two grounds, first that Adi
Kuini had recently been very sick and
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had undergone major operations in
Australia, and second that one of the
current FAP members of Parliament
should have been elected as leader.
These include Ratu Finau Mara (son
of Fiji's president), Viliame Cavubati
and Viliame Saulekaleka ( both mem-
bers from Lau Province), and Dr
Fereti Dewa (member from Naitasiri).
The conflict has not painted a very
healthy image of the party.
The Party of National Unity was
formed by the Ba Provincial Council.
Ba is one of the four provinces in
western Viti Levu and the second
largest province in terms of area in
Fiji. It boasts that within its bound-
aries are to be found major resources,
including gold, sugar, forestry,
tourism, various manufacturing indus-
tries, and Fiji's largest international
airport. In the history of Fijian poli-
tics, opposition to eastern Fijian
hegemony (which was reinforced by
British colonialism), has always
emerged from western Viti Levu. The
formation of the Party of National
Unity can also be seen as a protest
against "internal colonialism" in
Fijian society.
Eastern Fijian dominance began at
cession in 1874 and is still going
strong in 1999. The first western
Fijian prime minister, Dr Timoci
Bavadra, was overthrown by
Rabuka's coups in 1987. The coups
saw the return of eastern Fijian politi-
cal dominance when Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara became president and
coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka became
prime minister in the new Republic of
Fiji. Whereas the president has been
reelected for another five-year term
under the new constitution, the big
question now in Fiji politics is which
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coalition and which particular leader
will be the nation's first prime minis-
ter in the new millennium.
Toward the end of 1998 a new
Fijian political party, Na Veitokani
ni Lotu Vakarisito (the Christian
Fellowship Party) was formed by for-
mer Methodist Church President
Manasa Lasaro. A number of high
chiefs, who are members of both the
Fiji Council of Chiefs and the Meth-
odist Church, are supporters of this
party. Most of the members were
once supporters of the Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei. Rabuka's
coups have brought about the reemer-
gence of political independence
among indigenous Fijians, which has
led to the formation of new Fijian
political parties-a healthy sign in the
pursuit of democracy.
A closer look at the political lineup
for the 1999 elections reveals that the
likely Indian candidates have been in
either the NFP or FLP camps during
the last ten years. However, most of
the likely Fijian candidates have had
very colorful political histories, mov-
ing from the far right to the left and
back to the center of the political
spectrum, and surviving for lengthy
periods. The political careers of some
of these stalwarts have spanned
decades.
Consider the case of veteran politi-
cian Apisai "Mohammed" Tora, cur-
rent leader of the Party of National
Unity and one-time Muslim convert.
He began his political career in the
1960s after forming the very conserv-
ative National Democratic Party in
western Viti Levu, made up mostly of
indigenous Fijians. The party advocat-
ed "Fiji for the Fijians," the same
song that Sakeasi Butadroka, leader
-=='.....".."..,:=r=
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of the Fijian Nationalist Party, has
been singing ever since. After some
time the party merged with the Indian-
dominated Federation Party, giving it
the name National Federation Party.
In 1977 Tora was a member of the
National Federation Party when it
won the general elections, but a
"palace coup" spoilt their chance of
governing Fiji.
In 1984 Tora crossed the floor and
joined the Fijian-dominated Alliance
Party and became a government
minister as a result. In 1987, although
he won his seat in Parliament, the
Alliance Party lost the election to the
Fiji Labour Party-National Federation
Party Coalition. He then became
actively involved in the destabilization
moves prior to the 1987 coups. In
the early 1990S Tora formed another
new party, the All National Congress,
which failed to win a seat in the
general elections. Currently, as leader
of the Party of National Unity, Tora
will run in the general elections once
again. This time around his party is
involved in a coalition with the
Fijian Association Party and the Fiji
Labour Party, which he helped to
topple through the 1987 military
coups. Politics really make strange
bedfellows.
A number of questions are worth
considering. First, given the quality
of some of Fiji's politicians, can the
voters trust them to deliver on their
campaign promises? Second, given the
complexity of the "marriages of con-
venience" among the various parties,
can there be political stability? Third,
how can the kind of multiparty cabi-
net stipulated in the 1997 constitution
survive in such a political climate,
where even the ruling party's cabinet
lineup changes with the mood of the
prime minister? Fourth, if there is no
effective opposition, will there be a
repeat of the National Bank of Fiji
saga and other corruption and politi-
cal cover-ups?
The next government of the
Republic of Fiji has to take Fiji out of
the economic doldrums that have con-
tributed to the high crime rate and
high emigration rates. By November
1998 a total of 339 indigenous Fijians
had departed, compared with 3°° in
1997 (Post, IS Jan 1999). If indige-
nous Fijians are leaving Fiji for green-
er pastures, then something must have
really gone wrong with the promises
of the 1987 coups. Perhaps the new
multiparty cabinet of 1999 will lessen
the economic woes and forge greater
tolerance among the many ethnic
groups who call Fiji their home.
ALUM ITA L DURUTALO
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NEW CALEDONIA
The year 1998 was expected to be
more important for the political
future of New Caledonia than the
imminent turning of the millennium.
The Matignon Accord of 1988, which
brought peace to the troubled French
Overseas Territory, promised a refer-
endum on sovereignty after ten years.
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A vote did occur in November 1998,
but it was the ratification of a negoti-
ated agreement, the Noumea Accord,
not an up-or-down plebiscite on inde-
pendence as originally intended. In
fact, indigenous Kanak nationalist
leaders admitted they would probably
not have won a majority vote on full
sovereignty, because the Kanak are a
minority in their own islands and not
unanimous on the issue themselves.
Instead, the Noumea Accord repre-
sents a compromise between national-
ist and loyalist aspirations that could
be precedent-setting in its own right,
as a model of phased, gradual decolo-
nization in a complex, multiethnic
society. Conversely, it could also be
seen as another delaying tactic-this
time for fifteen to twenty years-that
perpetuates Caldoche (local French)
dominance in business and politics for
another generation.
The most salient issue during the
preceding year had been the creation
of a nickel processing plant at
Koniambo in the Northern Province
by the Front de Liberation Nationale
Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) in con-
junction with a Canadian investor,
Falconbridge. Strikes, blockades, and
hard negotiations between the FLNKS
and the French majority-owned
Societe Ie Nickel yielded a compensat-
ed transfer of Koniambo to the
Societe Minerale Sud Pacifique, which
the FLNKS hopes will generate three
thousand needed jobs in the North
and stem emigration to the loyalist-
dominated, industrial South. After an
agreement in principle before the end
of 1997, and a formal signing on I
February 1998, the final paperwork
was completed in mid-June (NC, 16
June 1998; IB Mar 1998, 26-27). The
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struggle for a northern plant was
symbolically important for President
of the FLNKS Rock Wamytan as a sign
of the economic reequilibrage (rebal-
ancing) proposed by the Matignon
Accord. But his single-minded pursuit
of that issue as a precondition for
political talks exacerbated existing
tensions within the Kanak nationalist
alliance over strategy (NC, 27 Sept
1997). In early 1998, the rush to a
much-heralded "consensual solution"
on sovereignty was almost anticlimac-
tic in terms of drama, much to the
relief of many residents.
Soon after the mining settlement in
early February, the FLNKS dismantled
its roadblocks and barricades, and
Alain Christnacht, former French high
commissioner in New Caledonia, flew
from Paris to Noumea, the territorial
capital, to restart political negotia-
tions after a hiatus of almost two
years. Delegations from the FLNKS
and the loyalist Rassemblement pour
la Caledonie dans la Reopublique
(RPCR) went to Paris at the invitation
of recently elected Socialist Premier
Lionel Jospin. The Matignon Accord
had been signed ten years earlier by
the same three parties, though the
Socialist premier of that era was
Michel Rocard, and FLNKS President
Jean-Marie Tjibaou was assassinated
in 1989 for his compromise. Jacques
Lafleur still leads the RPCR, but it has
since spawned dissidents, such as Une
Nouvelle-Caledonie pour Tous (UNCT)
led by rival Caldoche businessman
Didier Leroux. Wamytan's FLNKS has
also changed, accepting the Wallisian
Rassemblement Democratique
Oceanien (RDO), led by Aloisio Sako,
as a full member in February, and
maintaining on-again, off-again rela-
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tions with the Parti de Liberation
Kanak (Palika) and the Union
Syndicaliste des Travailleurs Kanak
et Exploites (USTKE). All three pro-
independence groups, however,
played supportive roles in the FLNKS
talks with ]ospin in Paris between
February and April, whereas Leroux
was not invited (interview; LEC, May
1998).
The FLNKS delegation set a dead-
line for agreement: 4 May, the ninth
anniversary of Tjibaou's assassination
and the proposed date for the grand
opening of the new cultural center
built in his honor outside Noumea.
The FLNKS sought a transitional status
of self-government "in association"
with France, but the RPCR'S secretary-
general, Pierre Frogier, opposed that
idea-ealling it akin to independence
-and instead wanted a lengthy post-
ponement of the sovereignty issue in
order to create a favorable investment
climate (EIU 1998, 18-22; IB, Dec
1998).1n March, membe.rs-orthe
FLNKS delegation voiced their views to
sympathizers in Paris. Bernard Lepeu,
president of the large Union Caledo-
nienne, said that the victory on the
northern nickel processing plant was
essential, in order to avoid letting
colonialism back in through the win-
dow after it was kicked out the front
door, as Tjibaou once warned. He
regarded the primary negotiation as
that between the Kanak people and
France, the colonizer, while that
between the FLNKS and the RPCR was
a secondary one between fellow
"victims of history." Yet Lepeu saw
the RPCR as one of two "menaces"
the FLNKS leadership had to face, the
other being a younger generation of
Kanak who viewed 1998 as the year
of independence. He said frankly,
"the two communities in Caledonia
cannot find a solution together," so a
constructive, conciliatory policy from
France was crucial. Eric Bessiere of
the small, Marxist unionist Parti
Socialist Kanak emphasized the immi-
gration issue, arguing that almost
20,000 people had arrived in the
territory since the Matignon Accord
(out of a total population of about
200,000), taking away jobs from local
inhabitants. At the same time, IIO
Chinese boat people were being held
in custody after anti-immigrant
demonstrations had forced the gov-
ernment to refuse them asylum. Lepeu
said that the electorate must be limit-
ed, instead of allowing any French
citizen to participate in important
plebiscites. Rene Porou of the Union
Progressiste Melanesienne supported
an "associated state" rather than the
"internal autonomy" that France had
proposed since 1996, because the
former implied a move toward full .
independence, not a terminal status
(KO: Rencontre avec Ie FLNKS, Mar
1998).
On 21 April, the three sides
reached agreement in Paris, and they
formally signed the new accord in
Noumea on 5 May, on schedule for
the Tjibaou Cultural Center's open-
ing. Wamytan proudly announced,
"Independence begins today!" (LEC,
May 1998), but Lafleur was soon
telling his own constituents, "New
Caledonia will never be independent"
(IB, Dec 1998, 30). After the docu-
ment was translated into 261 articles
of law, a referendum to approve the
accord was held on 8 November.
Overall, 74 percent of the territory's
106,706 registered voters participat-
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ed, and 71.87 percent voted yes on
the agreement. The Kanak-dominated
Northern and Islands Provinces regis-
tered the highest level of support,
86.79 percent and 95.47 percent
respectively, though less than half of
the voters in the Loyalty Islands went
to the polls. In the South, the voter
turnout was largest, 80.71 percent,
but only 62.99 percent voted yes-
about the same proportion who had
voted no on the Matignon Accord a
decade earlier. This apparent reversal
of sentiments did not prevent Lafleur
from expressing bitterness over the
fact that in his supposed stronghold,
Noumea, 42 percent still voted no
this year, mainly because of opposi-
tion to his personal power by Leroux
and other loyalists (IB, Dec 1998, 30;
PIR,9 Nov 1998). France meanwhile
had to amend its own constitution in
July to legalize the accord, and just
before Christmas, the French
Parliament passed a law that enabled
the new territorial statutes to take
effect (PIR, 5 July, 23 Dec 1998).
The Noumea Accord (NC, 6 May
1998) is unique in French consitution-
al history. In the preamble, which
Sylvain Pabouty of the FLNKS political
bureau credited to loyalist Kanak in
the RPCR such as Simon Loueckhote
of the Islands Province, France in
effect confessed to the injustices of its
past rule of New Caledonia. Paris
admitted that annexation did not con-
stitute a legal agreement with the
Kanak people, who had their own
civilization and were thereafter mar-
ginalized and traumatized despite eco-
nomic progress in the territory. France
agreed it was time to face up to "the
shadows of the colonial period," rec-
ognize Kanak customs and identity
435
(eg, spending 320 million French
francs on the new cultural c:enter),
and create a New Caledonian citizen-
ship that limits work and voting
rights to long-term residents. Kanak
customary law is equal to French civil
law, a Customary Senate has power
over all matters pertaining to Kanak
culture, Kanak languages are officially
equal to French, Kanak place names
will be revived, and Kanak cultural
artifacts will be returned from
abroad. Moreover, the Territorial
Congress will have more power to
make "laws of the country," and gov-
erning powers will devolve to it grad-
ually over fifteen to twenty years,
until by 2015 Paris will retain "only"
control over order (police), justice
(courts), defense, currency, and for-
eign affairs (though the territory can
participate in regional organizations).
The country will choose a new name
for itself-Pabouty mentioned Kanaky
New Caledonia as a possibility, in
imitation 6f Papua New Guinea
(interview)-and by 2015 the con-
gress will have three chances to pro-
pose a vote on independence.
Leaders on all sides hailed the
accord as a triumph of peaceful nego-
tiation and compromise, even though
obvious differences on the final out-
come remained (NC, 13 June 1998). In
July, the French parliamentary vote to
amend the constitution, to allow a
gradual but irreversible devolution of
powers, special citizenship, and
restriction of the franchise, was 827
to 31, a week before Bastille Day
(RAN, 7 July 1998). Both the Socialists
and Gaullist President Jacques Chirac
said they favored greater autonomy
for all Overseas Territories, and other
French Overseas Departments and
Il,
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Territories soon asked for just such an
arrangement-including the govern-
ment of Gaston Plosse in French Poly-
nesia, which until then had boasted
the most autonomy and been pro-
posed as a model by Paris (NC, 13
June 1998; PIR, 5 June 1998). By
some standards, the new accord is
progressive, insofar as it recognizes
inherent Kanak sovereignty while pro-
tecting the rights of other long-term
residents. Only local citizens (those
resident in 1988) will be able to vote
in the 1999 territorial and provincial
elections (lB, Dec 1998, 31). Support-
ers argue that "decolonization"
means the ending of colonial status,
not necessarily full independence, as
United Nations Resolution 1541
suggested in 1960, when it proposed
independence, free association, or
integration into the metropolitan
country as appropriate outcomes of
an act of self-determination (Aldrich
and Connell 1992, 297). Neverthe-
less, the FLNKS has asked die United
Nations to keep New Caledonia on
its Decolonization Committee's list, to
pressure France to follow through on
its commitments, and to encourage
non-Kanak residents to begin thinking
of themselves as part of a Pacific
nation. New Caledonia will now sit
as an observer in the annual Pacific
Forum meeting, joining the self-gov-
erning regional community with its
Kanak identity officially validated (lB,
Dec 1998,9,31-32). Meanwhile,
Pabouty and other Kanak leaders
argue that within fifteen years the
Kanak are predicted to become a
demographic majority, thereby assur-
ing the eventual triumph of Kanaky
(interviews) .
Not all responses were so positive,
however. Kanak writer Sarimin
Boengkih asked, "Why wait another
20 years?" Were the sacrificial deaths
of the I980s for nothing? "Our best
political leaders are gone," he lament-
ed, "and those who remain are not
capable of continuing and achieving
the work begun" (interview). USTKE
Vice President Gerard Jodar noted
that Lafleur can now retire with a
legacy of having prevented Kanak
independence during his political
career, while a new Kanak political
elite enjoys a higher standard of living
and risks losing touch with its own
grassroots base (interview). Some for-
mer FLNKS leaders, such as Fran~ois
Burck, Leopold Jon~die, and Raphael
Mapou, broke away and formed a
Federation des Comites de Coordina-
tion des Independantistes. They called
for a "mutation" of the leadership
class and soon allied themselves with
the RPCR (NC, 18 June 1998; inter-
view). Two rival patronage systems
were emerging, now that the FLNKS
will have an economic base in the
North, and gamblers were lining up
behind their favorites. Since Leroux
had failed to forge a "third force" in
the elections for the French Parlia-
ment in 1997, Thierry Vallet took half
the UNCT'S members over to the RPCR.
Yet the UNCT newspaper complained
that the Noumea Accord did not safe-
guard the democratic rights of local
residents against Lafleur, and Kanak
critics agreed that the powers trans-
ferred to the territory would continue
to be controlled by the RPCR "mafia"
(LEC, May 1998; KO, Mar 1998).
Nevertheless, the Noumea Accord
does confer a kind of nationhood on
New Caledonia, with important con-
trols over immigration, employment
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and voting rights, as well as national
identity symbols, all contentious
issues for a long time. Feeling threat-
ened, the three traditional rulers of
Wallis and Futuna protested to Paris
about the possible effect the accord
might have on the flow of remittances
sent home by Wallisians living and
working in New Caledonia-a dias-
pora that now totals over half the
Wallisian and Futunan population
(NC, 13 June 1998). The Noumea
Accord stipulates that "a particular
accord" must be negotiated between
Wallis and Futuna and New Caledo-
nia. When asked if that provision
might safeguard a loophole for his
compatriots, Tino Manuohalalo, the
RDO representative to the Territorial
Congress on the FLNKS list, said it
would more likely mean explaining to
his former compatriots that they
could no longer expect the same easy
access to a growing economy. In
effect, Wallisians will have to choose
wliich nation to belong to in 1999,
and the same is true of other recently
arrived French citizens (interview).
The proposed decentralization of
New Caledonia's relationship with
France places the country in that gray
zone occupied by so many territories
that lack full sovereignty in the
Pacific, from the freely associated
states to Tokelau and American
Samoa, which each enjoy significant
self-government while remaining
dependent on outside monetary trans-
fers. France still wants to have a glob-
al image, with the third largest mar-
itime exclusive economic zone, strate-
gic and cultural influence in every
ocean basin, and worldwide bases for
financial and commercial expansion
(Aldrich and Connell 1992; lB, Dec
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1998,31-34). Another generation of
francophonie in New Caledonia will
certainly further those goals. Yet
despite the challenge ahead for
Kanaky, whose leaders face opposi-
tion from local landowner associa-
tions and others who disagree with
their vision of economic development
based on mining and tourism, a new
nationality has been enshrined in law.
While economic strikes shut down the
port, daily newspaper, radio and tele-
vision stations, and main roads in
October, most were resolved by the
November referendum (IB, Dec 1998,
31; PIR, 14 Oct 1998). As they move
away from divisive political con-
frontations and colonial abuses, the
peoples of this bloodied territory may
yet find a way to set an example for
other multiethnic communities in the
region. Inflation is down, investment
is up (PIR, 14 Jan 1999), and the
local-born will receive increasingly
favored access to employment and
political power. Tlie provincial and
congressional elections of mid-1999
will no doubt provide a preview of
the difficult, long-term nation-build-
ing process to come. In December,
Islands Business magazine optimisti-
cally chose Wamytan and Lafleur as
its Men of the Year, but decoloniza-
tion is only beginning in New
Caledonia-again.
DAVID A CHAPPELL
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
According to Prime Minister Bill
Skate, natural and economic disasters
made 1998 a particularly tough year
for Papua New Guinea. Following on
the heels of a protracted drought, the
tsunami that struck the coast near
Aitape in West Sepik Province in July
exacted an enormous human toll. The
economy experienced some external
shocks in the form of declining com-
modity prices, which, coupled with
rising prices for imports, led to
aggressive budgetary action toward
the end of the year. The prime minis-
ter could take some comfort from the
significant progress in the peace
process on war-ravaged Bougainville,
and from his own political survival in
the face of constant criticism of his
ethics and leadership style.
The prospects for as many as 1.2
million rural dwellers appeared grim
at the beginning of the year as the
worst drought in a century continued
to disrupt supplies of food and water
throughout the country. However, by
early March more normal weather
patterns had resumed, allowing the
emergency relief operation spearhead-
ed by Australia to begin winding
down. In July, Australian medical and
military personnel were back in Papua
New Guinea as part of an interna-
tional effort to deal with the after-
math of the Aitape disaster. Shortly
before seven o'clock on the evening of
Friday, 17 July, an undersea earth-
quake measuring 7. I on the Richter
scale generated a fifty-foot wave that
swept ashore less than a minute later,
traveling up to a mile inland in some
places. The tsunami devastated an
eighteen-mile stretch of coastline,
killing more than two thousand peo-
ple and destroying the villages of
Sissano, Teles, Arop, IIiI, Warapu,
Malol, and Pera Nambis. Some of the
injured were flown out of the area or
treated at a hastily established field
hospital, while nearly nine thousand
survivors sought refuge in six tempo-
rary "care centers." Although the dis-
aster attracted immediate support
from overseas, rescue and relief
efforts were hampered by severe logis-
tical and communication problems,
which according to a United Nations
report released in August "may have
cost lives" (PIR, 18 Aug 1998).
Like all of his predecessors, Prime
Minister Skate discovered that man-
aging the national economy and
achieving "development," especially
in the rural areas where more than 80
percent of Papua New Guineans
reside, were difficult tasks. Early in
his term in office, Skate faced declin-
ing export receipts, especially for min-
erals and oil, and the virtual collapse
of timber exports resulting from the
economic crisis in Asia. Meanwhile
• ~:'" '. , <
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import costs were rising rapidly as the
value of the kina declined, and
drought-related relief efforts put addi-
tional strains on the budget. At the
beginning of 1998, economists were
forecasting declining foreign reserves,
rising inflation, negative growth in the
non-mining sector, and a growing
budget deficit. Delegates to a national
economic summit held in February
warned of a crisis as severe as that of
1994-9s, which precipitated a mas-
sive and controversial World Bank-
led bail-out effort (PR, 14 Feb 1998,
1,4)·
Like the Chan government before
it, the Skate government soon clashed
with the World Bank over the terms
of the ongoing support package. This
time the bank demanded as a condi-
tion for the release of A$90 million
that Skate dismiss his chief economic
adviser, Dr Pirouz Hamidian-Rad, a
former head of the bank's team
assigned to work with Papua New
Guinea. Hamidiah~Rad stated pub-
licly that not all of the many econom-
ic reforms demanded by the bank
were necessary, and that it was trying
to bully Papua New Guinea into
agreement. Meanwhile, the Skate gov-
ernment secured staged commercial
loans totaling us$I20 million from a
Brussels-based bank to support the
budget and dwindling foreign reserves
(PR, 21 Oct 1998, I), and embarked
on an aggressive reform program of
its own.
In July, Skate dismissed or reas-
signed twelve heads of government
agencies in the interest of increased
productivity in the public service, and
announced the establishment of a
Private Enterprise Ministry to identify
which government services could be
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privatized or corporatized. The 1999
budget introduced in November cut
more than five thousand public ser-
vice positions, relocated a further two
thousand to the provinces, abolished
fifteen statutory authorities and com-
mittees, and earmarked most govern-
ment departments for restructuring.
According to Treasury and Planning
Minister Iairo Lasaro, other measures,
including tariff reform and a value-
added tax, were designed to promote
smaller, labor-intensive businesses and
make the private sector "the engine of
growth." The budget also called for a
threefold increase in funds allocated
for rural and economic development
(PR, 30 Nov 1998, I). Previous plans
to downsize or radically restructure
the 6S,000-strong public service have
tended to falter in the face of strong
opposition, bureaucratic inertia, or
changes of leadership. Skate's reform
effort certainly provoked opposition
from the trade union movement,
which le<:l a rally of about two thou-
sand at Parliament to demand that
the budget be scrapped (PIR, 24 Nov
1998). However, by year's end Skate
remained determined to implement
the reforms, and his political position
seemed relatively secure.
Skate proved himself adept at the
politics of survival during 1998. Early
in the year he was cleared of bribery
allegations associated with videotapes
secretly recorded by former adviser
and Australian businessman Mujo
Sefa and aired on Australian televi-
sion. According to Police
Commissioner Peter Aigilo the evi-
dence on the videotapes themselves
was insufficient to make a case
against Skate and Police Minister
Thomas Pelika, who also appeared on
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the tapes. Aigilio said Sefa had failed
to produce "concrete evidence" of the
alleged wrongdoing, which included
authorizing bribes for journalists and
politicians. Sefa claimed he had coop-
erated with the inquiry-and prompt-
ly released further secretly recorded
videos to the Australian media (PIR, 2
Feb 1998). Meanwhile, Skate accused
his former Deputy Prime Minister
Chris Haiveta, whom he had fired in
late 1997, of conspiring with Sefa to
discredit his government.
The dispute with Haiveta led Skate
to dump Haiveta's Pangu Pati from
the coalition and elevate People's
Progress Party leader Michael Nali to
the position of deputy prime minister.
However, he appointed Pangu Pati
stalwart and former Prime Minister
Sir Rabbie Namaliu to his new cabi-
net, and in the next few months sig-
nificantly increased his support in
Parliament. By August, Skate's shake-
up of the top echelons of the public
-. .
serVICe was causmg some unease
among the coalition partners, who
claimed they were being excluded
from decision making. Members of
the People's Democratic Movement,
the Independend Alliance, the United
Resource Party, and even Skate's own
PNG First party, were uncomfortable
with the influence wielded by eco-
nomic adviser Hamidian-Rad and
Public Service Minister Ian Ling-
Stuckey, who had rejoined the cabinet
after being fired in late 1997 along
with other members of the Pangu
Patio They also claimed that they had
not been consulted about Skate's
plans to replace Michael Nali with
two deputy prime ministers, Ling-
Stuckey and People's Democratic
Party Leader lairo Lasaro.
In October, Skate dismissed Nali
and all his Peoples Progress Party col-
leagues from the coalition, accusing
them of causing "instability" in his
government. Although Nali was out-
spoken in his criticism of Skate,
describing him as "the most inconsid-
erate, egotistical, irrational and errat-
ic" politician he had ever met, seven
of the twelve parliamentary members
of the People's Progress Party opted
to stay with the government and
joined Skate's PNG First party (PR, 26
Oct 1998, I). lairo Lesaro was duly
appointed deputy prime minister, and
by the end of the year the prime min-
ister could claim the support of 63
members of the I09-seat Parliament.
Some cabinet and coalition changes
during the year were attributable to
disagreements over policy. Nali, for
example, claimed he had been dumped
as deputy prime minister because he
strongly opposed the reappointment
as Defence Force commander of
Brigadier General Jerry Singirok,
dismissed in 1997 for his role in the
Sandline mercenary crisis (Wesley-
Smith 1998). However, much of the
maneuvering reflected a familiar form
of coalition politics involving the
strategic use of cabinet positions to
consolidate parliamentary support
and ward off threatening votes of no
confidence in the prime minister.
Early in the year Skate tried to intro-
duce radical constitutional changes
that would make it much more
difficult to remove a prime minister
during the five years between general
elections. These efforts were unsuc-
cessful, leaving Skate facing the possi-
bility of a vote of no confidence after
his eighteen-month period of immuni-
ty from such votes expired in
.."
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February 1999 (PR, 28 March 1998,
6). To thwart opposition attempts to
mount such a vote, in December
Skate adjourned Parliament for eight
months, leaving critical legislative
business unfinished and putting the
Bougainville peace process in jeopardy.
This was a generally encouraging
year for residents of Bougainville after
a decade of war that had claimed the
lives of an estimated twenty thousand
people. The peace talks that com-
menced on 19 January at Lincoln
University, near Christchurch in New
Zealand, involved more than two
hundred delegates representing the
major parties to the conflict, as well
as high-level delegations from neigh-
boring countries. The meeting was
attended by the prime ministers of
Papua New Guinea, New Zealand,
and Solomon Islands; Papua New
Guinea's leader of the opposition; the
foreign ministers of Australia and
New Zealand; as well as observers
from Fiji, Vanuatu, and the United
Nations. On 23 January, the protago-
nists endorsed the Lincoln Agreement
on Peace, Security and Development
on Bougainville. Sir John Kaputin,
chief negotiator, and Sam Akoitai,
minister for Bougainville Affairs,
signed on behalf of the Papua New
Guinea government. Joseph Kabui,
vice president of the Bougainville
Interim Government, and Sam
Kauona, commander of the Bougain-
ville Revolutionary Army, signed on
behalf of the secessionist rebels, while
Premier Gerard Sinato added the
endorsement of the officially sanc-
tioned Bougainville Transitional
Government. Hilary Masiria signed in
his capacity as commander of the pro-
government Resistance Force, and
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three of Bougainville's representatives
in the national Parliament, John
Momis, Michael Laimo, and Michael
Ogio, also pledged to support the
agreement.
The Lincoln Agreement provided
for an ongoing process of reconcilia-
tion between the warring parties. It
announced a "permanent and irrevo-
cable" ceasefire, to take effect on 30
April 1998, and a phased withdrawal
from the province of the Papua New
Guinea Defence Force. An interna-
tional Peace Monitoring Group would
be deployed in Bougainville while a
civilian police force was recruited and
trained. There would be a general
amnesty for crisis-related offenses,
and all parties would cooperate in
"restoration and development" activi-
ties on Bougainville. Unlike earlier
peace agreements, the Lincoln Agree-
ment did not attempt to tackle the
key divisive issues head on. There was
no agreement on Bougainville's future
political status, although the parties
did agree to discuss "the political
issue," and establish a Bougainville
Reconciliation Government, before
the end of 1998.
Although the agreement was wide-
ly hailed as a success, implementing
some of its terms proved difficult. The
ceasefire agreement, hammered out in
more detail in Canberra in March,
was duly signed on 30 April at the
provincial capital of Arawa in front
of a large crowd of Bougainvilleans
and visiting dignitaries. The unarmed
Peace Monitoring Group, consisting
of forces from Australia, New Zea-
land, Fiji, and Vanuatu, replaced a
similar Truce Monitoring Group
deployed in Bougainville since
November 1997. In April, the United
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Nations Security Council issued a
statement in support of the Lincoln
Agreement, and the UN secretary-gen-
eral dispatched an observer mission to
Bougainville to help monitor the situ-
ation. However, Kabui and other
Bougainville leaders were concerned
about apparent delays in the with-
drawal of Papua New Guinea troops
provided for in the agreement.
Although the government declared
Arawa town a demilitarized zone in
June, troops did not actually leave
there until August following a cabinet
decision to rescind the constitutional
call-out order issued in 1989. Even
then, the soldiers remained in the
nearby port town of Loloho, albeit
under the normal legal provisions of
the constitution. Perhaps more omi-
nous was the refusal of rebel leader
Francis Ona to participate in the
peace process despite numerous invi-
tations to do so. He continued to
assert that full and unconditional
independence was the only acceptable
option for Bougainville, condemned
Kabui's and Kauona's involvement in
the peace process, and threatened to
kill members of the Peace Monitoring
Group.
Not surprisingly, "the political
issue" continued to be the most trou-
blesome one to deal with. Joseph
Kabui made it clear on several occa-
sions during the year that he and his
supporters still regarded independence
as their ultimate goal, and that they
saw the proposed Bougainville Recon-
ciliation Government simply as a
means to that end. Prime Minister
Skate made it equally clear that inde-
pendence was never going to be an
option, although he did seem open to
the idea of a phased transfer of pow-
ers leading to a considerable degree of
autonomy for the province. Well into
the second half of the year, no consen-
sus regarding the composition of the
Reconciliation Government had
emerged, and no timetable for its
establishment had been determined.
The national government seized the
initiative in September, announcing an
agreement with the parliamentary
opposition that would establish an
interim reconciliation government on
I January 1999, to be replaced by a
fully elected government before the
end of June. The agreement did not
determine the composition of the
government, although it did stipulate
that the four Bougainville members of
Parliament would be full members of
the assembly (PIR, 29 Sept 1998).
Arguing that they had not been con-
sulted, and that they did not recog-
nize the Papua New Guinea constitu-
tion anyway, Kabui and other leaders
in Bougainville opposed the initiative,
taking particular exception to the
automatic involvement of the national
members of Parliament in the new
government.
The debate about the Bougainville
Reconciliation Government was rude-
ly interrupted in early December
when opposition members boycotted
Parliament, preventing Skate from
getting the two-thirds vote necessary
to amend the constitution and clear
the way for the new government. The
boycott was staged to protest the
prime minister's plans to adjourn
Parliament so as to avoid a vote of no
confidence, although Skate claimed
that the opposition had agreed to sup-
port the passage of the amendment if
he agreed to reconvene Parliament by
July 1999 (PR, 14 Dec 1998, I).
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Meanwhile, leaders in Bougainville
vowed to establish a Bougainville
Reconciliation Government in the
new year, outside the terms of the
constitution if necessary. This was a
significant setback for the peace
process, and also a setback for Skate,
who had been able to claim progress
on the Bougainville issue as one of his
government's most notable achieve-
ments.
TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
On 7 July 1998 Solomon Islands cele-
brated twenty years of constitutional
independence. The highlight of the
celebrations was the first Melanesian
Arts and Cultural Festival, which
brought together in Honiara perform-
ers from Papua New Guinea,
Vanuatu, Fiji, and New Caledonia.
There was even a delegation from
Taiwan. The festival also coincided
with the nation's annual Trade and
Cultural Show. Furthermore, two
weeks prior to the independence
anniversary celebrations, Honiara had
hosted the Pacific History Association
conference, which attracted more
than a hundred budding and estab-
lished Pacific Islands scholars from
the Pacific Islands and beyond. It was
a busy time for Honiara.
The events of June and July reflect-
ed a politically busy year for Solomon
Islands. Generally, 1998 was a year of
political optimism. The government
pushed for reforms and seemed confi-
dent that its program would steer the
nation away from the political insta-
bility and economic hardships that
have characterized the public land-
scape in the last two decades. It was
obvious, however, that many of the
reform proposals were not entirely
new. They reflected neoliberal and
economic rationalist initiatives else-
where, especially those propagated by
international financial institutions and
aid agencies.
To understand the political events
of 1998, it is necessary to have some
knowledge of the political and eco-
nomic developments of previous
years. In particular, the factors that
influenced the outcome of the August
1997 national elections are pertinent.
Solomon Islands since indepen-
dence has been characterized by a
high turnover of governments, which
resulted from, among other factors,
undeveloped political party systems,
individually biased voting patterns,
and the frequency of motions of no
confidence against successive prime
ministers. Consequently, Solomon
Islands has had eight governments
and five prime ministers in the last
twenty years, making it difficult to
implement policies. Governments
often did not survive the four-year
term and spent much time and effort
trying to stay in power.
Furthermore, by the beginning of
the 1990S the economy had fallen
through the cracks, causing debts to
rise beyond the government's ability
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to repay. By the end of 1997 govern-
ment debts amounted to SI$1.2 bil-
lion, which was more than double the
country's 1998 budget. The debt crisis
was exacerbated by successive govern-
ments' failure to service loans. By the
end of 1997 arrears from loans had
reached a staggering SI$192 million.
This deteriorating economic situation
was caused by a variety of factors
such as: a weak balance of payments
exposed by the collapse of the log
export trade at the end of 1997;
uncontrolled government spending
and noncollection of revenue, result-
ing in a history of large unbudgeted
fiscal deficits; massive public debt
arrears and denial of further credit to
the government, which placed exces-
sive pressures on both the government
budget and foreign reserves; weak
public administration characterized by
low productivity; low levels of skills
and morale; the collapse of manage-
ment and maintenance systems linked
to the poor financial perfo-rmance of
the public sector, resulting in rapid
depreciation of economic and social
infrastructures and services; the
absence of political will on the part of
governments to undertake reforms;
and the lack of a coherent and feasi-
ble strq,tegy for the correction of
structural weaknesses of the economy.
The negative political and econom-
ic situations were exacerbated by
widespread allegations of corruption
and the misappropriation of public
money. In 1995, for example, five
cabinet ministers were charged with
receiving bribes from an accountancy
firm and a logging company. In 1996
thirty-five public servants were sus-
pended after allegedly misappropriat-
ing SI$1O million of public money.
In 1997 a number of government
ministers and senior public servants
allegedly misappropriated SI$ 1.3
million from a Special Project Develop-
ment Fund paid to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as compensation for
illegal fishing in Solomon Islands
waters. Despite these allegations, no
one was convicted. A few public
servants have either been suspended
or redeployed to other ministries.
By the time Solomon Islanders
went to the polls in August 1997
there was widespread desire for a
change of government. Nearly every
candidate went into the election call-
ing for "change" as part of their
campaign rhetoric, an idea that
caught the attention of a public dis-
satisfied with the state of the economy
and the inability of the previous
government to alleviate the problems.
Consequently, 48 percent of the
members of Parliament who sought
reelection were defeated.
Immediately after the elections a
coalition government of seven politi-
cal parties was elected to power, with
Bartholomew Ulufa'alu as prime
minister. The government included
a number of new politicians who
represented a younger generation of
leaders. Among them were people
like Manasseh Sogavare, Fred Fono,
Patterson Oti, Dr Steve Aumanu,
and Alfred Sasako, who brought to
Parliament their experiences in the
public service and the private sector.
They had been staunch critics of the
previous Mamaloni-Ied government
and immediately pushed to detour
from its paths. They named their
group the Solomon Islands Alliance
for Change (SIAC) government.
Within weeks of being elected to
" mol." I
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office, they put together a policy
statement advocating economic and
administrative reforms. The details of
the reform program, however, were
never widely discussed, and the con-
cept was relatively new for a majority
of Solomon Islanders. Nevertheless,
the reform program was soon
launched as a consequence of wide-
spread support from international
institutions and aid agencies, and a
Policy and Public Sector Reform
Committee was later established to
work out the details. It was the most
important agenda item for the SIAC
government during its first year in
office, and included plans for privati-
zation and restructuring of the public
service.
In its privatization program, the
government proposed to sell its shares
in Solomon Telekom, the company
responsible for telecommunication in
the country, and Solomon Islands
Plantations Limited, which invests in
the oil palm industry; Both are joint-
venture operations between the Solo-
mon Islands Government and British
multinational companies. The govern-
ment owns 58 percent of shares
(about sl$I7.6 million) in Solomon
Telekom, while the other 42 percent
are held by Cable and Wireless of the
United Kingdom. The plan was for
the government to sell 48 percent of
its shares to Cable and Wireless,
reserving the other 10 percent for the
Investment Corporation of Solomon
Islands, the government's investment
arm. The other option is for the gov-
ernment to sell its shares to the Solo-
mon Islands National Provident Fund,
the country's only superannuation
scheme.
With Solomon Islands Plantation
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Limited, the Solomon Islands Govern-
ment owns 30 percent of shares
(SI$13.7 million), another 68 percent
belong to the Commonwealth Devel-
opment Corporation, and the remain-
ing 2 percent are held by the land-
owners of the Guadalcanal Plains.
The plan was for the government to
sell 20 percent of its shares (SI$9.1
million) to the Commonwealth
Development Corporation, leaving the
other 10 percent with the Investment
Corporation of Solomon Islands.
These shares will be paid into a Trust
Unit to be set up in 1999, and eventu-
ally sold to interested local people
and monitored by the Trust Unit
(Star, Oct 1998).
The other major aspect of the SIAC
government's reform program is
restructuring the public service, which
has proven to be an expensive institu-
tion marred by poor productivity and
low levels of skills and morale. In
1997, public service salaries claimed
an increasingly significant proportion
(35 percent) of recurrent expendi-
tures, taking into account the unbud-
geted 14.5 percent salary increase for
public service employees at the end of
1996. The reform program aims to
restructure the public service in order
to make it smaller and less expensive,
as well as to encourage transparency,
accountability, cost-effectiveness, and
efficiency. A greater role is to be given
to the private sector through out-
sourcing. Under the proposed reform
program, approximately 550 public
servants would be made redundant, a
measure that was expected to save
about sl$16.5 million. Under the
redundancy package the first affected
would be permanent secretaries, who
have been recommended for early
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retirement. In a letter to permanent
secretaries in July 1998, the govern-
ment stated that the reason for their
premature retirement was to facilitate
improvements in the public service.
They were, however, given thirty days
from 28 July to make representations
to the Public Service Commission
(SIBC News, 3 I July 1998). New sec-
retaries to ministries were appointed
in December 1998.
As a result of plans to layoff pub-
lic servants, a redundancy package
worth about SI$7.2 million was final-
ized in September 1998 to be award-
ed to the first 550 public servants to
be laid off. Funding for the package
was secured under a program of loan
assistance from the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (Star, 29 Sept 1998).
Furthermore, as part of the govern-
ment's attempt to reduce the size of
the public service and make it more
efficient and effective, the administra-
tive functions of several government
ministries have been amalgamated
(SIBC News, 17 July 1998). However,
the number of ministries has increased
from fourteen to twenty, attracting
numerous criticisms from the public
and causing skepticism about the SIAC
government's plans to reduce the size
of government. A letter to the editor
in Solomon Star (28 July 1998)
doubted the government's claim that
it would save money under the reform
program. The author stated that 550
officers receiving an average of
SI$10,000 each for a minimum service
period of ten years would cost the
government about sl$6 million in
redundancy payments. Moreover, an
additional payment of 51$6 million
would drain the National Provident
Fund of its financial resources. In
total, payments made to layoff 550
officers would come to about SI$12
million. But the government is bor-
rowing from the Asian Development
Bank to pay for the redundancy exer-
cise. What are the implications of this
loan for the long term?
Another interesting aspect of the
reform program is that despite the
prime minister's claim that the pro-
gram was "home brewed," it soon
became obvious that much of what
was proposed characterized reform
initiatives elsewhere in the developing
world. These reflected agendas propa-
gated by international institutions and
aid agencies. Within months of the
SIAC government's establishment,
Honiara was hosting representatives
from the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, and the European
Union. Aid donors were quick to
express support for the government's
reform programs. The European
Union, for example, in July 1998
granted Solomon Islands US$I.3 mil-
lion under a financing agreement to
be used for strengthening the adminis-
tration of the Ministry of National
Planning and Development, in partic-
ular, the administration of European
Union-funded projects. That was in
addition to an ongoing us$23 million
in development assistance to Solomon
Islands from the European Union
(PACNEWS, 13 July 1998). In another
development, the British government,
in August 1998, announced its cancel-
lation of Solomon Islands' aid debt of
us$ 5 million. This was as part of a
gesture of support to the SIAC govern-
ment's reform program. The debt was
part of a loan taken in 1981 as an
independent settlement from the
~;.
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British government (SIBC, 7 Aug
1998). Furthermore, to support the
government's reform program, the
Asian Development Bank approved a
loan of US$25 million to assist clear
"debt arrears, right sizing the public
service and improving public sector
management" (PACNEWS, I} July
1998). At the time of writing, a fur-
ther loan of US$IO million was being
negotiated with the World Bank to
assist the government in the areas of
education, health, and the country's
financial sector (SIBC, 12 Oct 1998).
In the midst of the public-service
reform euphoria the realities of Solo-
mon Islands political culture were
never far away. During the first sitting
of Parliament under the new govern-
ment, in April 1998, a motion of no
confidence was moved against Prime
Minister Ulufa'alu. It followed allega-
tions that the prime minister was
involved in the illegal sale of govern-
ment houses and land in Honiara.
Again, on IS September 1998, anoth-
er motion of no confidence was
moved against the prime minister,
triggering a major constitutional crisis
that landed the governor general, the
government, and the opposition in
court.
The September motion of no confi-
dence followed months of political
wrangling between the opposition and
the government. It was sparked off by
the prime minister's sacking of
Finance Minister Manasseh Soqavare
in July, which resulted in two govern-
ment ministers and three back-
benchers leaving the government:
Minister for Education and Human
Resources Development Ronidi Mani;
Minister for Police and Justice Lester
Saomasi; and backbenchers, Allan
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Paul, Nathaniel Waena, and Johnson
Koli. Consequently, by early August
the opposition had made a submission
to the governor general seeking the
prime minister's resignation because
he allegedly did not have the majority
needed to rule. To back its claims the
opposition presented a list containing
twenty-five signatures to prove it did
have the numbers to rule. This would
give the opposition a clear majority in
the 49-member Parliament. (Solomon
Islands Parliament normally has 50
members. However, the member for
Gao-Bugotu, James Saliga, died earli-
er in the year.) Opposition Leader Job
Duddley Tausinga called on the prime
minister to resign because he no
longer had the support of the mem-
bers of Parliament, saying it would be
"an abuse of the democratic system
enshrined in the constitution and a
mockery of the principles of trans-
parency, responsibility and account-
ability" (PACNEWS, 10 Aug 1998). The
opposition deman-dedthat ifUlufa'alu
did not resign then the governor gen-
eral must call a special meeting of
Parliament to vote on a motion of no
confidence (PACNEWS, 7 Aug 1998).
At that time, Governor General Sir
Moses Pitakaka was in Brisbane for
medical treatment. Acting Governor
General Paul Tovua, who was also the
Speaker to the National Parliament,
in considering the opposition's sub-
mission, rejected calls for a special
meeting of Parliament. In a letter of
II August 1998, Tovua informed the
opposition leader that there was no
need to call for a special parliamen-
tary session because the next meeting
was scheduled for 12 October (Star,
12 Aug 1998).
When the governor general
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returned, he at first upheld the acting
governor general's decision. However,
a few days later he reversed the deci-
sion and called for a special parlia-
mentary session to vote on the motion
of no confidence. This ignited a major
political uproar and constitutional cri-
sis. After much constitutional debate,
Parliament eventually met on 18 Sep-
tember 1998 to discuss the motion of
no confidence. After a short debate, a
vote was taken, ending in a 24-vote
tie. The member for West Honiara,
Lester Saomasi, was in Rennell-
Bellona Province and refused to travel
to Honiara despite the opposition
chartering an aircraft to bring him
back.
The events of July to September
were nearly a replay of the 1994 inci-
dent that resulted in the collapse of
Francis Billy Hilly's government after
only eighteen months in office. Within
twelve months of taking office, the
Ulufa'alu-Ied SIAC government faced
two motions of no confidence, which
took a lot of time and effort away
from its reform program. Further-
more, there is no guarantee that this
episode will not be repeated in the
remaining three years of its life.
Following this experience, Prime
Minister Ulufa'alu stated that there is
a need to amend the constitution to
limit the number of political parties in
the country. This, he stated, would
"ensure political stability and enable
the government of the day to imple-
ment its policy and programs. . . .
There is a need to develop political
parties more professionally, so that
those contesting national and provin-
cial elections can run on party plat-
forms which have ideologies, princi-
ples, policies and objectives" (Radio
Australia, Pacific Islands Report, 25
Nov 1998).
Parliament eventually met in
October and did not adjourn until
late November. Apart from the 1998
budget, a number of bills were
passed. These included the Fisheries
Bill, the Environment Bill, and the
Leadership Code Bill.
By December, the country was
beginning to settle down for the
Christmas and New Year holidays.
But the peace was disrupted by inter-
island tensions between Guadalcanal
and Malaita people following assaults
ori a number of Malaitans living on
Guadalcanal. The events were con-
nected to statements made by Guadal-
canal Provincial Premier Ezekiel
Alebua during the handing over of
alienated land at Lunga, east of
Honiara. During the handing-over
ceremony he made statements to the
effect that other settlers in Honiara
must respect Guadalcanal people and
their cultures. Some young Guadal-
canal men interpreted that as a signal
to chase other Islanders, especially
Malaitans, who have settled on
Guadalcanal. The premier also out-
lined a number of demands the Gua-
dalcanal Provinces intended to submit
to the central government.
By mid-December, the crisis had
taken a militant turn. Some men
attacked a police station on Yandina
on the neighboring Russell Islands
and obtained arms. On 30 December
1998, a young man from Guadalcanal
was shot dead by police at Mbungana
Island in the Central Islands Province,
and another was wounded. By New
Year's Day 1999, the crisis had fur-
ther escalated. Yet the government
continued to use the police despite the
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availability of other avenues for con-
flict resolution.
It was a gloomy end for 1998 and
a frightening beginning for 1999. It
seems the Bougainville crisis has been
reincarnated across the border in
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Solomon Islands. This overshadowed
a politically active 1998 and an opti-
mistic year for many Solomon
Islanders.
TARCISIUS TARA KABUTAULAKA
